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1. Moral realism in eighteenth-century moral philosophy 
“A philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or 
ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her 
throat,” as Crispin Wright once observed.  Such an observation effectively conveys the familiar 1
uneasiness with these terms of art, along with a kind of prejudice against views apt to be 
considered as realist. In a similar vein, Korsgaard writes that “[t]here is a trivial sense in which 
everyone who thinks that ethics isn’t hopeless is a realist.”  In this perspective, examining a 2
philosophical view with regard to these terms risks being not very productive. ‘Realism’ and ‘anti-
realism’ are maybe even more ambiguous than similar terms of art, to the extent that merely 
declaring a view realist or not-realist does not amount to a helpful statement. Things may become 
especially problematic when such labels are applied to philosophical views of the past, as in 
discussing Hume’s or Kant’s own thought, since they did not employ these terms to characterize 
their perspectives. Here the risk of anachronism seems difficult to avoid. As John Skorupski has 
recently remarked, the very attribution of the label ‘moral realism’ (or ‘moral realist’) to views 
which do not share specific philosophical assumptions with the current debates, for instance 
regarding the semantics of moral words or the truth-value of judgments, is hardly appropriate, 
since it connects or even equates views that are in fact heterogeneous in important respects.  3
In light of these difficulties, a helpful way to gain a clearer understanding of the questions 
at issue with regard to Kant is, I believe, to briefly consider what moral realism could be taken to 
mean in eighteenth-century discussions and whether such terms are applicable to them at all. The 
risk of anachronism, in this case, is mitigated by the historical emergence of the use of the term 
‘realism’ with regard to the foundations of morals. The first philosopher who characterized a 
position as realism regarding morals, and explicitly endorsed it, was probably Shaftesbury. In The 
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Moralists, he distinguishes philosophers who “hold zealously for Virtue, and are Realists in the 
Point” from those who “are only nominal Moralists by making Virtue nothing in it-self, a 
Creature of Will only, or a mere Name of Fashion.”  The explicit history of the concept of moral 4
realism begins here. Notably, when the label ‘realism’ was used again about a century and a half 
later to characterize a specific view in moral philosophy, it happened exactly with reference to this 
passage.  According to Shaftesbury, the realist about virtue “endeavours to shew, ‘That it is really 5
something in it-self, and in the nature of Things: not arbitrary or factitious, (if I may so speak) 
not constituted from without, or dependent on Custom, Fancy, or Will; not even on the 
Supreme Will it-self, which can no-way govern it: but being necessarily good, is govern’d by it, 
and ever uniform with it.’’’  The opposition between moral realism and moral anti-realism is 6
thereby construed in a fairly straightforward way as simply concerning the fundamental contrast 
between views holding that moral properties (virtue, merit, goodness) are entirely independent 
from the activity of any mind and views holding, on the contrary, that they are dependent on the 
activity of minds. According to this understanding of the terms, the two conceptions are 
mutually exclusive. 
Now, it might still appear unwarranted to directly apply this understanding of the terms at 
issue to Kant, if only because no analogous definitions of ‘moral realism’ are to be found in 
eighteenth-century German moral philosophy. Indeed, that those labels carried the risk of some 
misunderstanding even then becomes clear when one considers the German translation of 
Shaftesbury’s remarks. If Johann Joachim Spalding’s translation has ‘Realisten’ for ‘realists,’ it 
renders ‘nominal Moralists’ with ‘Titularsittenlehrer,’ that is, ‘moralists only by name.’ Thereby 
Spalding alters the opposition, which, put in those terms, does not contrast moral realists with 
anti-realists, but genuine moral philosophers with merely pretending ones.  Spalding’s mistake 7
indicates a difference between German and British terminology in this respect. Unlike 
Shaftesbury, German eighteenth-century philosophers mostly employed ‘realism’ and its antonym 
‘idealism’ as metaphysical terms, not extending their use to the discussions on the foundations of 
morals. Nevertheless, we can safely discuss moral realism and anti-realism also with regard to 
Kant and other eighteenth-century German writers, since we thereby understand the 
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fundamental issue concerning the independence of moral criteria and principles from the activity 
of any mind.   8
Approaching Kant’s view from this angle is helpful not only to avoid anachronisms and 
conceptual confusion, but also to highlight how his view relates to the alternatives that 
characterize the previous discussion. First of all, we should recognize that Kant shares with earlier 
moral realists some of their core theses. Against voluntarist accounts of morality, pre-Kantian 
moral realists argued that understanding morality as dependent on commands issued by an 
authority makes them arbitrary and contingent.  Moral realism developed out of the aim of 9
defending the objective and necessary status of moral truths, which are regarded as firm and 
‘eternal’ as mathematical truths, and like these are equally shared by finite rational beings and 
God. In Leibniz’ formulation, for instance, the “formal reason” that “should teach us what justice 
is […] must be common to God and to man,” the difference between them being “only one of 
degree.”  Finally and most importantly, moral requirements are fully cognizable by human 10
reason, either because they are evident to the mind or because they can be known as grounded in 
the nature of things. In the most optimistic version of this thought, there are no genuine 
epistemic hindrances to moral cognition, but only “corruption of Manners, or perverseness of 
Spirit”  can interfere with it. This kind of moral realism, therefore, does not merely consist in 11
affirming the reality of moral distinctions, but in maintaining that they are expressions of a 
mind-independent order.  The underlying assumption is that only such an order, since it is not 12
contingent, can provide the proper basis for accounting for three fundamental ideas: morality is 
objective, necessary, and cognizable by every rational being.  13
Kant shares all of these three main points, which he seems to take as included in the 
common understanding of morals. Against voluntarist accounts, Kant employs much the same 
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arguments as Cudworth and Leibniz, arguing that also divine-commands conceptions of morality 
are unable to vindicate its absolute necessity and make of the moral laws merely positive laws (cf. 
e.g. 29: 627).  Much like previous realists, Kant maintains a rationalist view on the Euthyphro 14
question, holding that “suicide is not abominable because God has forbidden it, but because it is 
abominable He has forbidden it” (NK: 174, cf. 38 f. and MC: 262). He even deploys the 
traditional analogy between morality and mathematics to stress that moral laws are “immutable,” 
so that not even God can change their content (cf. NK: 79 = 27: 283, 27: 547, 27: 137, 29: 
634).  In the later essay The End of All Things, Kant even observes that the moral law “as an 15
unchanging order lying in the nature of things, is not to be left up to even the creator’s arbitrary 
will to decide its consequences thus or otherwise” (ED: 339). When he remarks that both God 
and finite rational beings are subject to the same moral law, even if in modally different terms (cf. 
GMS: 414, KpV: 32), he elaborates the same thesis. Furthermore, as with earlier realists, Kant 
holds that the common human reason as such can easily cognize moral principles (cf. KpV: 152 
ff., G: 255 f.). 
A possible objection to this way of framing the matter at issue is that Kant’s main aim 
regarding the foundations of practical philosophy is shared not only by previous moral realists, 
but by previous anti-realists as well, as long as they are not willing to give up the idea that moral 
judgments and their criteria have to be regarded as objective and universally valid. In other 
words, according to the objection, the only aim would be to guarantee the objectivity of morals, 
and that would not be enough to commit to moral realism in any specific sense. However, Kant’s 
aim is not simply to account for the pretensions of realism, as this task is understood in current 
debates,  but more specifically to argue for strong realist theses and their implications, only on 16
different grounds and through a different strategy than earlier moral realists. 
However, while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims 
about morality, he believes that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way than 
it had been before. A crucial part of Kant’s main aim in practical philosophy is to defend the 
distinctive contentions of moral realism – i.e., that moral criteria are objective, necessary, and 
epistemologically accessible – through a novel philosophical strategy, quite different from the 
strategies deployed by previous moral realists. 
 On Kant’s criticisms of moral voluntarism, see Bacin (2017, § 3).14
 On the analogy and its pre-Kantian usage, see Gill (2007).15
 Cf. e.g. Star (2013, p. 820).16
4
2. The weaknesses of pre-Kantian moral realism 
Other means are needed when a certain way of managing things proves insufficient or is 
inadequate with regard to the intended goal. On the reading I suggest, this also holds with 
respect to Kant’s practical philosophy, which can be interpreted as arising out of dissatisfaction 
with the previous versions of moral realism. The standard variants of moral realism can be 
regarded as unable to defend its basic tenets, which thus require following a different path. The 
reasons why Kant deemed it necessary to reject the traditional realist approach can be 
summarized in three main points. 
First, in Kant’s view, moral realism faces significant difficulties in moral epistemology. On 
the traditional approach, status and possibility of moral cognition often remain unclear, or 
exceedingly demanding.  If the cognition of moral principles requires an insight into the fabric 17
of reality, it seems that it must be as demanding as metaphysical knowledge. In spite of the 
insistence on the evidence of moral principles, traditional moral realism faces serious issues in 
explaining this evidence. Especially from the standpoint of Kant’s critical philosophy, an insight 
into the nature of things is not possible beyond the limits of experience. Furthermore, since in 
traditional realist accounts moral obligation is intrinsically linked with the awareness of the 
natural law, the difficulty in clarifying the possibility of an adequate cognition of the nature of 
things also affects any attempt to vindicate moral obligation. 
Second, the tendency of traditional moral realism to conflate theoretical and moral 
knowledge has another important implication that must be regarded as a fatal flaw from Kant’s 
standpoint. On the traditional realist view, the difference between theoretical cognition and 
practical cognition gets lost because both are merely representational, since they provide the 
mind with the representation of some aspect of the reality of things. On the contrary, Kant holds 
that moral cognition is to be understood as essentially practical and that, therefore, it must be 
construed in non-descriptivist terms as being not about states of affairs, but about grounds for 
actions (cf. JL: 86, KpV: 20). Traditional moral realism appears unable to explain how the 
cognition of features of reality immediately provides grounds for action, if not by assuming a 
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prior desire for the object regarded as good. Therefore traditional moral realism falls under the 
general principle of the heteronomy of the will. 
Third, the limits of that conception of moral knowledge lead to an additional reason for 
dissatisfaction with traditional realism. Since practical cognition is not about states of affairs, but 
about grounds of action, Kant has to also reject the thought that moral qualities are to be 
understood as properties of actions, which is characteristically maintained by traditional moral 
realists in opposition to the sentimentalist thesis that goodness and rightness of actions are 
nothing but “perceptions in the mind.”  In Kant’s view, this conception does not reflect ordinary 18
moral thinking and misses again the essentially practical character of moral concepts and 
judgments, which do not describe anything but rather express requirements. The concepts of 
good and bad that we apply to actions do not refer to objects and their qualities but follow from 
a “determination of the will a priori” (KpV: 65) that requires actions. Again, traditional moral 
realism can ground requirements only by referring back to some prior desire for an object with 
specific features. Accordingly, a view capable of accounting only for a heteronomous 
determination of the will ends up regarding some features of objects as good-making properties.  
Finally, all of Kant’s reasons for dissatisfaction with traditional moral realism ultimately 
lead to highlighting what must be, in Kant’s eyes, its crucial limit, namely the inability to 
adequately account for moral obligation. Traditional moral realists characteristically hold that the 
natural law immediately entails moral obligation, which is understood as part of the reality of 
things as much as the law itself. Intrinsically normative facts immediately impose an obligation, 
without an obligating subject. Thus, for instance, Clarke declares that the “eternal and necessary 
differences of things make it fit and reasonable for Creatures so to act; they cause it to be their 
Duty, or lay an Obligation upon them, so to do; even separate from the consideration of these 
Rules being the positive Will or Command of God.”  Similarly, Wolff maintains that the natural 19
law is binding by a “natural obligation” independent of any act of imposition, because “nature 
has connected motives with men’s inherently good and bad actions.”  In Kant’s view, however, 20
features of reality cannot give rise to obligations that satisfy the requirements of universality and 
necessity. The immediate transition from a fundamental law to a genuine moral obligation, in his 
eyes, is unwarranted, at least in the relevant case of finite rational subjects. Kant’s remark that the 
concept of obligation had not been made clear yet and that the central issue of practical 
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philosophy remains unsolved (cf. UDG: 298 and GMS: 450) certainly holds with regard to 
traditional moral realism and its difficulties in accounting for the binding character of moral 
requirements. 
For these reasons, I suggest that in Kant’s view the traditional versions of moral realism are 
not able to meet the demands that motivated them in the first place. Since those philosophical 
and practical demands still hold for him, it is necessary, from his standpoint, to develop different 
means to meet them in order to build a satisfying conception. 
3. Kant’s non-realist strategy: The outline 
Instead of the immediate connection of natural law and obligation, which is characteristic 
of earlier moral realism, Kant’s conception revolves around a two-level model, centered on the 
distinction between law and obligation, that is, between the principle of moral normativity and 
the binding validity of moral demands. His development of that model makes of his novel 
defense of the tenets of moral realism a hybrid view on the foundations of morals. 
On the one hand, much like earlier realists, Kant still maintains that the moral law must be 
understood as non-positive and “practically necessary,”  that is, fully independent, both as to its 21
existence and its content, of the action of any mind, even of God’s, as I mentioned before. On 
the other hand, Kant combines this feature of the traditional realist view with a non-realist 
conception that makes moral obligation dependent on the action of the finite rational will. 
Departing from previous moral realists, Kant argues that the moral law does not carry an 
obligation in itself, since the obligation generates only through the practically necessary consent 
of the finite rational beings subject to the moral law. The genuine source of moral obligation is, 
in this view, the autonomy of pure practical reason (cf. GMS: 439 f., KpV: 33).  
The combination of realist and non-realist elements in Kant’s view is reflected in his use of 
the distinction between the role of author of the law and the role of author of the obligation. The 
distinction was already present in previous writers like Baumgarten and Meier,  but Kant 22
deploys it to put forward a different view than theirs. According to Kant, the author of the law 
and the author of the obligation correspond in the case of positive laws, generated through a 
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contingent imposition of the will, which determines both their normative content and the 
corresponding obligation. In the case of non-positive (i.e., “natural”) laws, as is the moral law, the 
two roles are to be kept distinct, since the content of the law is not dependent on any imposition, 
whereas the corresponding obligation is.  For Kant “moral laws have no author” (PPP: 145), if 23
they are to be understood as necessary and unconditionally valid. The only authorship that can 
be claimed for such non-positive laws is the authorship of obligation. Now, to be author of the 
obligation is precisely the function of a legislator, who makes the law binding through the 
consent of his or her will (cf. e.g. MSV: 544 and 583, also R 6187, AA 18: 483). 
Kant’s solution to the problem of defending moral realism revolves around a very close 
connection between cognition of the moral law and legislation, that is, on the thought that moral 
subjects can have access to the law only through the practically necessary recognition of grounds 
for acting. Generally, most earlier moral realists were rationalists because, some minor differences 
notwithstanding, they regarded reason as the faculty of the mind, i.e. “the capacity to have 
insight into the interconnection of truths.”  Such a view is for Kant not a viable option. First, 24
his transcendental idealism argues against the possibility of adequate knowledge of the features of 
reality beyond the boundaries of possible experience.  Second, Kant also has a specifically moral 25
objection to such views, which construe moral cognition as knowledge of some feature of reality. 
As long as they make the cognition of moral demands dependent on facts and features of the 
world, they make moral demands heteronomous. In contrast with such views, Kant’s novel moral 
rationalism is centered on the idea that access to the moral law can be only provided by the same 
faculty to which moral demands are addressed. 
Traditional realist positions were essentially descriptivist, as they tracked the source of both 
moral normativity and obligation back to some metaphysical feature of reality, conflating the 
fundamental principles of morality with their obligation. In contrast to such positions, Kant’s 
account can accommodate both descriptive and non-descriptive aspects in morality, making sense 
of its action-guiding nature. As practical cognition, moral cognition does not represent features 
of things, but is about prescriptive grounds for acting. These grounds are essentially prescriptive 
only as a consequence of “the subjective constitution [Beschaffenheit] of our practical 
 Cf. MS: 227 and 19:131, 19:156, 19:247, MC: 283, 27:1433, MSV: 544 f., NK: 79, and also Päd: 494.26-33. 23
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faculty” (KU: 403, cf. GMS: 414) of finite rational beings. At the same time, the fundamental 
law on which prescriptive moral demands are based is not prescriptive per se, as it describes a 
perfectly rational will, to which as such no obligation applies.  Obligation is the mode of 26
morality only for beings whose maxims are not eo ipso universally valid like laws. The conceptual 
distinction between the moral law (moralisches Gesetz) as the fundamental law of pure practical 
reason and the prescriptive principle of morality “that we call Sittengesetz” (KpV: 31), i.e., the 
categorical imperative, is a crucial clue for the proper understanding of Kant’s view.  The former 27
is the principle of practical rationality as such and does not contain any prescription, since it 
expresses the constitution of the perfect rational will. The latter is the principle legislated through 
the autonomy of pure practical reason in finite beings, upon which it imposes an obligation. 
Prescriptions and imperatives can only enter the stage once the moral law is recognized by finite 
rational agents as binding. 
On the reading I am proposing, Kant elaborates a hybrid view of moral obligation 
structurally similar to the one put forward by some previous writers, such as Suárez and 
Barbeyrac. Suárez distinguishes between the natural law as belonging to the nature of things and 
full-fledged, binding moral demands. The latter do not directly derive from the natural law, but 
require God’s command, in order to become laws proper through an imposition. The natural law 
as such is merely a lex indicans, which presents normative contents, but is not binding yet until 
the authoritative imposition of the divine will generates genuine prescriptions drawing on the 
perfectly rational content of the natural law.  Closer to Kant’s time, Barbeyrac had made some 28
points that suggested a similar conception. Moving, as it were, in the opposite direction than 
Suárez, Barbeyrac tried to defend Pufendorf ’s position from Leibniz’ criticisms by incorporating 
naturalist elements into a voluntarist account.  Barbeyrac argued that, if “one grounds the 29
obligation (properly so-called) to practice the rules of justice in the will of God,” “this supreme 
being’s right of command is founded in reasons whose justice is immanent.” In fact, for 
 Cf. e.g. KpV: 32: “In the supremely self-sufficient intelligence, choice is rightly represented as incapable of any 26
maxim that could not at the same time be objectively a law, and the concept of holiness, which on that account 
belongs to it, puts it, not above all practical laws, but indeed above practically restrictive laws and so above obligation 
and duty.” (I have corrected the translation, which misses a few words in the last sentence.)
 See e.g. Wolff (2009, p. 524 f.).27
 A related analogy between Kant’s and Suárez’s views regarding the relation has been suggested by Ludwig (1997). 28
Here I cannot directly address the question. 
 See Stern (2012, pp. 71 ff.).29
9
Barbeyrac, God “wants us to conform our external and internal acts” to the “relations of 
propriety, order, beauty, honesty, […] to which justice reduces,” that reason reveals to us.   30
Similarly with Suárez and Barbeyrac, Kant distinguishes between a fundamental principle 
of rationality and the principle of moral obligation imposed by an authoritative will, thereby 
combining insights of the traditional realist views with a voluntarist take on obligation. Now, I 
do not contend that either Suárez or Barbeyrac should be regarded as direct sources of Kant’s 
view. In fact, the basic distinctions on which Kant draws in developing his account of the 
foundations of morals (i.e., law vs. obligation, author of the law vs. author of the obligation) 
were available in the conceptual vocabulary of pre-Kantian discussions on natural law, so that it 
was not necessary to refer to Suárez or to Barbeyrac as such to be aware of the possibility of 
distinguishing the two levels of the normative principle and its obligation. After Suárez other 
writers deemed it necessary to combine rationalist and voluntarist approaches in explaining moral 
obligation. However, taking into consideration the paradigm exemplified in those earlier hybrid 
views helps us see in Kant’s a similar pattern, which makes the complexity of his novel 
conception apparent. At the same time, the contrast with the pre-Kantian examples of the hybrid 
paradigm is helpful to highlight three features distinctive of Kant’s own new view, which regard 
the meaning of the concept of law, the role of the legislator, and the character of moral cognition. 
(1) In contrast to the Suárezian hybrid view, in Kant’s view the concept of law is basically a 
metaphysical notion. Following a tradition culminating in Aquinas, Suárez still understood laws 
in general in a primarily political sense and holds that in the proper meaning of the word laws are 
addressed to rational beings and are intended to govern their behavior. For Suárez, if we speak of 
a law of nature, it is only by analogy in a derivative, metaphorical sense.  In contrast to this 31
conception, Kant understands the concept of law in primarily descriptive terms, that is, as a rule 
expressing a non-contingent regularity (or normativity) in a given domain. While the 
commentators have often interpreted Kant’s talk of moral laws stressing the analogy to political 
laws, he in fact always parallels moral laws with laws of nature.  For him, the concept of law 32
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belongs to metaphysics as well as to practical philosophy, so that the distinction between laws of 
nature and moral laws, or laws of freedom (cf. e.g. GMS: 387) differentiates between two species 
of the same kind, thereby highlighting that both are “principles of the necessity of that which 
belongs to the existence of a thing” (GMS: 469, cf. KrV: A113).  It is in virtue of the 33
fundamental univocal meaning of the concept of law that Kant can regard as entirely appropriate 
introducing the form of a law of nature as a schema or a ‘type’ of the moral law in the application 
to particular cases (cf. KpV: 69).  Kant’s understanding of natural laws in general develops 34
further a conception present in previous German rationalists, who defined as law any rule that 
states a determination, in contrast with the voluntarist understanding of laws as commands.  By 35
elaborating such an anti-voluntarist concept of natural law, Kant accentuates the fundamental 
realist assumption that moral laws do not originate from any act of imposition by a subject, but 
express non-contingent normative features of reality. Moral laws must therefore be regarded as 
independent of any will, as to their authority and content. 
(2) The most apparent difference from the earlier hybrid paradigm, however, is that, in 
Kant’s conception, the role of legislator is not (only) played by God, but also by reason in finite 
subjects. The categorical imperative qua imperative is a “command (of reason)” (GMS: 414), and 
is in fact the only genuine command that reason issues, as it is unconditional and necessary. It is 
not an external legislator, but pure reason that “gives (to the human being),” as well as “all finite 
beings that have reason and will,” the moral law (the Sittengesetz) (KpV: 31 f.). Unlike earlier 
rationalists, Kant stresses that the character of command belongs to moral demands not simply 
subsidiarily, but essentially. The crucial legislative role of reason lies in determining the moral 
demands as commands. Thereby Kant holds that finite reason is not merely able to grasp the 
contents of the moral law, as previous realists had already maintained, but that that ability is 
sufficient to determine the obligatory character of moral demands. The inherent normativity of 
the moral law as internal law of practical rationality suffices to establish imperatives without 
needing the authority of a “third being” to impose the law, to borrow the formulation Kant 
sometimes deploys in his lectures (cf. e.g. MC: 277, NK: 61).  
 For an analysis of Kant’s concept of law that stresses its univocality across theoretical and practical contexts, see 33
Watkins (2014).
 See Klotz (2001).34
 Cf. Wolff (1733, § 16), Wolff (1736, § 475), Baumgarten (1757, §§ 83-84). For an explicit contrast with Crusius, 35
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However, regarding not the divine will, but pure reason in finite subjects as the legislator of 
the moral law does not merely amount to an internalization of moral lawgiving. In fact, here lies 
Kant’s most significant departure from traditional moral realism. The role of the legislator does 
not consist in the mere transmission of the normative content of the law, as if his function were 
only about applying it to a particular domain.  Lawgiving entails the recognition and the 36
confirmation of the law through the will of the legislator (cf. e.g. MC: 283, NK: 79). This is 
precisely what pure reason does in Kant’s view: It recognizes the moral law as its own 
fundamental law, which inescapably demands consent. Through the necessary consent to the 
fundamental law, reason recognizes its validity, if only in prescriptive terms, because of the limits 
of finite beings. For Kant, moral obligation is not a given, but only arises through this lawgiving 
activity. Since he understands obligation as “necessitation of a rational being by the mere 
cognition of the law,” the moral law can bind a rational being only insofar as the subject 
“cognizes its universal validity for every will, hence also the necessary consent [die nothwendige 
Einstimmung] of his will” (R 6187, AA 18: 483). 
In contrast to traditional realist views, therefore, moral obligation is not detected and then 
applied to specific moral requirements, but is established through an imposition of the rational 
will, rather along the lines of voluntarist conceptions. Only an authoritative will can institute a 
valid obligation, and the rational will is authoritative because of the moral law. Kant does not 
explain moral obligation through the limits of finite rational beings, but through their being 
rational, which warrants them an access to the fundamental moral law. They can thus institute 
moral obligation according to the constitution of their own practical faculty. Therefore, the 
transition from a conception where the divine will legislates the moral law to a conception where 
pure reason plays that role allows Kant to account not simply for the phenomenological fact that 
moral demands have prescriptive character, but also for their binding authority as grounded in 
the fundamental law of practical reason.  37
(3) In Kant’s view, furthermore, the lawgiving of the moral law also plays a crucial 
epistemological role, which marks a significant difference from earlier conceptions. Unlike 
traditional moral realists, Kant does not maintain that moral cognition can be explained as a sort 
of knowledge of facts or features of the world. In fact, he develops the voluntarist idea that the 
 Here I refer to Baxley (2012, pp. 571 ff.), who has aptly remarked, against Stern (2012), that the question 36
concerning the authority of morality and the question concerning the experience of morality in prescriptive terms 
must be kept separated.
 I have presented in greater detail a reading of Kant’s conception of the self-legislation of the moral law in Bacin 37
(2013a).
12
promulgation of the law belongs to lawgiving and is an essential part of establishing it as binding. 
For instance, Suárez had remarked that “the lawmaker should manifest, indicate or intimate this 
decree and judgment of his, to the subjects to whom the law itself relates.” If he does not do so, 
his will “could not be binding.”  It is necessary to the bindingness of the law that the subject 38
have access to it, and the lawgiving act, establishing obligation, satisfies also this essential 
condition. Kant’s view follows this voluntarist conception of moral lawgiving in order to make 
full sense of moral obligation and to account for the simplicity of moral cognition, overcoming 
the limits of traditional moral realism. Although, for Kant, no valid factual cognition is 
warranted beyond the domain of possible experience, moral subjects can gain a proper access to 
moral demands in virtue of their partaking in the moral lawgiving. “We can become aware of 
pure practical laws […] by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us 
and to the setting aside of all empirical conditions to which reason directs us” (KpV: 30). Kant’s 
solution to the epistemological problem affecting traditional moral realism revolves around the 
idea that moral cognition is to be achieved only through autonomy and the resulting obligation. 
The difficulty of accounting for the possibility of a fully adequate cognition of moral 
requirements is overcome by abandoning the basic descriptivist assumption of traditional moral 
realism. For Kant, moral cognition is neither to be understood as knowledge of facts, nor as 
knowledge of properties of its objects, but rather as the cognition of principles providing 
inescapable normative grounds for actions, which are specifications of the categorical imperative 
legislated by pure reason as a general principle of moral obligation. Moral cognition is thereby 
vindicated not as the cognition of something real, but as the cognition of something constructed 
by the activity of reason, supported by its fundamental constitutive principle. Moral cognition is 
not about external reality, but is in fact centered on “the self-consciousness of a pure practical 
reason” (KpV: 29). Autonomy as self-legislation of a fundamental law of rationality is what 
explains that “what is to be done […] is seen quite easily and without hesitation by the most 
common understanding” (KpV: 36). 
The comparison with the previous hybrid paradigm first introduced by Suárez’s view thus 
underscores three crucial innovative features that give to Kant’s new hybrid view a different 
character, determining the peculiar nature of his defense of moral realism through a radical 
transformation of the philosophical strategy. I shall highlight the main features of the resulting 
position in the final section. 
 Suárez (1612, I.iv.12, 57; cf. I.xi).38
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4. Kant’s idealist transformation of moral realism 
On the interpretation I am suggesting, Kant’s view on morality should be seen as marking 
a turning point in the history of moral realism and its confrontation with different variants of 
anti-realism, since he undertakes a transformation of moral realism into a more complex hybrid 
view. After such elaboration, in Kant’s view moral realism can no longer be merely defined as the 
thesis of the mind-independent nature of morality in general. More precisely, after Kant moral 
realism as the thesis of the mind-independence of moral criteria, and moral anti-realism as the 
thesis of their mind-dependence can no longer be regarded as mutually exclusive. In fact, the 
combination of both is distinctive of Kant’s new conception. 
A characterization of Kant’s position that only focuses on its distance from traditional 
moral realism would offer only a partial explanation. For instance, because Kant’s view cannot be 
reduced either to realism or to voluntarism, some commentators have suggested that Kant should 
be understood as maintaining a form of cognitive irrealism. However, although this reading 
rightly highlights the novelty of Kant’s approach with regard to simpler options, it obscures that 
Kant’s rejection of factualism, that is, of the thesis that (moral) propositions are made true by 
corresponding facts that obtain, does not amount to a full rejection of realism.  Even if for Kant 39
moral principles are not propositions whose truth conditions are provided by their 
correspondence with facts, this does not entail that his position is ipso facto irrealist, but only 
that his conception of practical cognition is non-descriptivist. In fact, if realism consists in 
affirming the mind-independent status of some fact or principle, as I have proposed at the outset, 
this leaves open the possibility of acknowledging in Kant’s view a significant element of moral 
realism in that every practically necessary principle enjoys mind-independent authority, although 
he holds to non-descriptivism. According to the interpretation of Kant as a cognitive irrealist, he 
cannot hold a realist view because “we can only know the noumena as they appear to us, and that 
they appear to us only through receptivity.”  Also, this remark neglects the relevant differences 40
between theoretical and practical cognition. Not only does Kant maintain that practical 
cognition is not about what appears and in fact is possible in virtue of the activity of reason, but 
he also states that our cognition of the moral law presents exactly a crucial instance of something 
that can be acknowledged as real without being empirically known.  
 Skorupski (2010, pp. 11 ff.).39
 Skorupski (2010, p. 487n15).40
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A further significant level of Kant’s moral realism lies in the fact that he strongly holds that 
the cognition of the moral law opens up the possibility to refer (albeit in non-theoretical terms) 
to an order of reality that he clearly does not understand as mind-dependent. On some occasions, 
Kant even refers to an “order of things,” deploying an almost Malebranchian formulation (cf. e.g. 
KpV: 42, 49). It is understandable that later attempts at elaborating Kant’s views have 
downplayed, if not utterly dismissed, this aspect, which is, within Kant’s philosophical outlook, 
intrinsically connected with demanding metaphysical and epistemological theses and with a 
robust conception of reason.  Nevertheless, Kant’s view in its complexity would lack an essential 41
component if that connection were severed.  42
While a substantial part of Kant’s aim is to defend the contents of common moral thinking 
against inadequate philosophical accounts, the elements of realism in his view are not confined to 
the realm of experience. He develops a new view without abandoning a realist conception of the 
fundamental moral law.  In this respect, Kant does hold to a strong realist view. If robust realism 43
is the thesis that “there are objective irreducibly normative truths,”  Kant holds a robustly realist 44
position about the moral law. This is not the whole story, of course, as he holds at the same time 
that the mere existence of normative data (or facts) is neither sufficient to provide the specific 
kind of normativity that we call moral obligation nor sufficient to make the cognition of moral 
obligation possible. However, if we define our understanding of moral realism by referring to a 
distinction between procedural realism and substantial realism,  we should argue that Kant does 45
not merely hold a procedural realism but a substantial realism about the moral law as well. That 
is, Kant does not merely argue that “there are answers to moral questions; that is, that there are 
right and wrong ways to answer them,” as procedural realists are supposed to, according to 
Korsgaard’s definition, but in fact also believes, like the substantial realist, that “there are answers 
 On the latter, see e.g. Watkins (2010).41
 See Ameriks (2003, p. 269). 42
 Sensen (2013) has also pointed out a realism of the moral law in Kant’s position.43
 Cf. Enoch (2011, p. 4).44
 Cf. Korsgaard (1996, pp. 35 f.).45
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to moral questions because there are moral facts or truths, which those questions ask about”.  46
This holds for him only with important qualifications, though. The basic normative truth 
consists in the fundamental law of practical reason, which cannot be directly grasped. The 
answers to moral questions refer to that basic normative truth, but cannot be simply derived 
from it. In Kant’s view the reference to those normative data cannot possibly be immediate, but is 
constitutively mediated by the way in which pure practical reason is able to cognize them, that is, 
is able to become aware of the moral law through autonomous lawgiving. Kant thus combines a 
substantial realism about the moral law with a quite different view about moral obligation, which 
in fact builds the core of his new conception.  
The complexity of his view with regard to the terms of current debates also stands out 
clearly if we consider another distinction between weaker realism, which holds that moral 
properties are independent of any particular experience, but are “waiting to be perceived,” and 
stronger realism, which holds that moral properties are not constituted by the possibility or a 
(human) response.  Kant holds a stronger realist view regarding the fundamental moral law, 47
since he argues that it is independent of any response at all. On the other hand, his view on 
moral obligation cannot be construed as a form of realism, even of the weaker kind, because, if 
moral obligation does not presuppose any particular interest and is cognizable by every moral 
agent as such, neither moral obligation nor any other moral notion are “waiting to be perceived,” 
according to Kant. All of them are in fact dependent upon the activity of reason. A further 
significant weakness of the characterization of Kant’s view as irrealist is that it obscures this 
crucial point, namely, that the standards of moral cognition do not lie in the correspondence to 
external facts but that they arise from the activity of reason. 
 Bojanowski denies that Kant’s view can be regarded as a case of substantial realism. However, he lists a number of 46
aspects on which it would appear that it can be, after all. In fact, Bojanowski does remark that “Kant and the 
substantial realist both agree that moral cognition is a case of ‘immediate’ cognition (5:29). Kant also agrees with the 
substantial realist in thinking that the ‘data’ (‘datis’), the given, is not something cognized by us 
empirically.” (Bojanowski 2012, p. 15). On the other hand, Bojanowski argues that “Korsgaard’s procedural realism 
does not go far enough. Practical reason does not simply cognize some procedure or criterion for distinguishing 
between good and bad maxims. What I cognize is not a mere procedure for making choices, but the good itself. 
Since this is not an appearance, but a noumenon, Kant’s position shares with substantial realism the conviction that 
practical cognition is cognition of an object that is independent of the arbitrary choices of individual 
subjects” (Bojanowski 2012, p. 18). The significant differences separating Kant’s view from substantial realism are: 
that (a) Kant understands these “data,” as “given by the activity of reason itself, rather than by some source external 
to it” (Bojanowski 2012, p. 15, cf. p. 17), and (b) that Kant maintains that “the existence of this object depends on 
individual, empirical subjects” (Bojanowski 2012, p. 18). On my reading, both these differences depend on Kant’s 
new conception of moral obligation, through which he aims at emending traditional moral realism, in fact, 
profoundly modifying it.
 Dancy (1986).47
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The interpretation I am putting forward can be further clarified by pointing out an analogy 
with Kant’s view in the theoretical domain. In spite of the differences between morality and 
knowledge, the combination of a realism of the moral law with a non-realist account of moral 
obligation suggests an analogy with Kant’s perspective on the theoretical use of reason, which 
helps us see the multi-layered combination of realism and non-realism in his conception of the 
foundations of morals. As the analogy with the theoretical domain shall suggest, the non-realist 
aspect can be characterized as idealist, to use a Kantian term that allows a clearer contrast with 
the elements of realism within Kant’s position without implying that they should be seen as 
mutually exclusive.  Kant seems to follow his German contemporaries in that he never uses the 48
notions of realism and idealism with regard to morals, mostly employing these terms only for 
metaphysical and epistemological views.  Nevertheless, I believe that these terms can be safely 49
applied here to show how Kant’s view on the foundations of morals merges theses holding the 
mind-independent character of some elements and theses holding the mind-dependent character 
of others.  50
If empirical realism in epistemology is the view that our judgments correspond to 
something real in the world (cf. KrV: A375, A491/B520) in accordance with the common 
understanding of the objectivity of knowledge, Kant defends in moral philosophy the idea that 
moral judgments correspond to what he sometimes calls the constitution (Beschaffenheit) of the 
 Bojanowski (2012) has also proposed to understand Kant as an idealist about morality, but on partially different 48
grounds than those that I suggest here. He argues that Kant is committed to moral idealism because he holds that 
the practical use of reason and practical cognition aim at bringing their objects about (see esp. Bojanowski 2012, pp. 
18 and 21; cf. KpV: 15, 46). He therefore insists more on the opposition between idealism and realism. 
 One exception is Kant’s contrast between idealism and realism about natural ends in KU: 391 ff.49
 By using ‘idealism,’ I do not mean to imply any significant contrast with the more often used label 50
‘constructivism.’ Insofar as it maintains the mind-dependent character of moral principles, constructivism, in its 
Kantian version, can be construed as a form of idealism, in the sense I am using the term here. (For a detailed 
comparison between the labels of idealism and constructivism and their implications, see Rauscher 2015, pp. 23 ff.). 
Still, it is important to underscore a difference between ‘idealism’ and ‘constructivism.’ Unlike idealism, 
constructivism should be not understood in opposition to realism, as has been often pointed out against realist-
minded critics of constructivism and constructivist interpretations of Kant, since constructivism as a general view 
about morals does not intend to deny every kind of reality to moral principles and values (see Bagnoli 2011 and 
Rauscher 2015). I have discussed the relationship between Kant’s view and moral constructivism in Bacin (2013b). 
See also Sensen (2013).
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action (cf. e.g. NK: 39).  Lying is fundamentally wrong, and it would be so even if it would have 51
never been disapproved or never have been regarded as the violation of a principle. Moral realism 
is vindicated if we are able to explain how the moral subjects are capable of such judgments about 
the moral worth of actions.  
In theoretical philosophy, transcendental idealism centers on the thesis that the forms 
through which we are able to have knowledge of objects are not derived from the nature of things 
and that the features of objects are not represented as belonging to the things in themselves (cf. 
e.g. KrV: A27 f./B44). In practical philosophy, Kant analogously maintains that the criteria of 
moral judgment and the moral notions like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not acquired by an insight into 
the nature of things, but are obtained by the practical use of reason. Like the pure concepts of 
understanding are “self-thought a priori principles of our cognition” (KrV: B167), the basic 
criterion of morality, that is, the categorical imperative, is self-given, i.e., self-legislated in the 
practical use of pure reason. Kant’s conception is thus characterized by an idealism about 
obligation. Following the parallel with theoretical philosophy, here I call idealism the view that 
moral obligation is dependent on some (necessary or constitutive) operation of the agent’s mind, 
so that there is no such thing as moral obligation outside the dimension of finite rational subjects 
as co-legislating the moral law. The obligation not to lie arises only from the practical necessity to 
recognize that in virtue of the fundamental moral law, lying is wrong. Accordingly, we know that 
lying is wrong only through the unconditional command not to lie. An account of moral 
obligation as dependent on pure practical reason is, for Kant, the key to preserving an account of 
moral demands as objective, necessary and not dependent on any contingent human interest or 
desire, which can be called in turn a realism of the contents of common moral thought.  
One remarkable aspect of Kant’s idealist conception is that it rejects the talk of moral 
properties as inappropriate or merely superficial. In this respect Kant’s view appears more strongly 
anti-realist than Hutcheson’s or Hume’s, since both of them had stressed the analogy between 
moral properties and secondary qualities, as I mentioned before. The so-called moral properties 
are in fact, for Kant, just the outcome of the imposition of principles.  Drawing on a voluntarist 52
 Although I am largely in agreement with Rauscher’s reading, I do not follow him in adopting the qualifications 51
‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ for realism and idealism (see Rauscher 2015, pp. 19 ff. and 244 ff., as well as his 
chapter in the present volume), since I suspect that they might be equivocal with regard to practical philosophy. 
When Kant mentions empirical realism, the qualification is referred to the realm of possible experience, which is not 
directly relevant in the practical use of reason. Also using ‘transcendental’ in this context would require examining 
Kant’s remarks on the separation between transcendental philosophy and practical philosophy. (I discuss the issue in 
Bacin 2006, pp. 159-164.)
 See also Rauscher (2015, p. 4).52
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conception, Kant holds that concepts as ‘good’ cannot be construed as designating natural, mind-
independent properties, but only as determining a moral qualification of actions through 
obligation, that is, through the legislation of autonomy. ‘Good’ is a predicate that we ascribe to 
actions whose maxims conform to the categorical imperative and are thus recognized as 
universally valid (cf. KpV: 68 f.).  Therefore, while Kant aims at a stronger position than merely 53
maintaining the reality of moral distinctions, he does not go so far as holding that such 
distinctions directly correspond to mind-independent qualities.  54
The distinction between levels of realism and levels of idealism in Kant’s conception would 
be incomplete, however, if it did not include the strong realism about the moral law as the 
fundamental law of practical reason, which I have already pointed out. Since Kant strongly holds 
to the idea that the fundamental law of practical reason is independent from any mind’s activity, 
he can argue that the access to the same moral law allows finite rational beings to cognize, if only 
partially, God’s mind, much like previous rationalists had maintained. However, Kant’s solution 
to the epistemological issue of traditional moral realism entails a modification of that thesis about 
the moral law. While there is an important conceptual distinction between moral law and 
categorical imperative, there is no corresponding real difference at hand, since finite rational 
beings can cognize the moral law only as the categorical imperative through its bindingness. 
Kant’s realism about the moral law is inseparable from his idealism about obligation. Since this 
connection centers on the thesis that the moral law is the fundamental law of practical reason, 
which can be cognized only by virtue of the autonomy of practical reason, I suggest that it would 
be appropriate to call this a practical realism of the moral law.  
This brief reconstruction of the different aspects of Kant’s position concerning the 
foundations of morals shows how it cannot be regarded as an instance of either moral realism or 
moral anti-realism in their simplest variants. On the contrary, as I have argued, an appropriate 
understanding of Kant’s view has to take into account that his basic philosophical aim is largely 
convergent with traditional realism and with several of its assumptions. Kant’s view is the 
position of a moral realist who believes that traditional moral realism is unable to solve the 
central issue of practical philosophy, that is, to vindicate moral obligation while holding to the 
 Against Stern (2012, pp. 35 ff.), thus, I do not hold Kant’s view to be compatible with value realism.53
 In the terms suggested by Gill (2006, p. 296), Kant is certainly not merely an anti-egoist realist, but he is not a 54
traditional “Ptolemaic realist” either, since he does hold that “moral properties exist independently of the human 
mind and that our moral judgments represent those properties accurately.” His distinctive view introduces a 
mediation regarding our access to the real ground of moral distinctions, which are not merely reflected in our moral 
concepts and judgments.
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basic tenets of moral realism. At the same time, it is at least equally important to realize that his 
philosophical strategy is different and that it is not only novel but also especially significant, since 
this strategy contributes to the solution of the main issue of clarifying the source of moral 
obligation, adopting solutions that are incompatible with traditional moral realism. Since this 
non-realist or idealist strategy provides the core of Kant’s answer to the moral question of the 
validity of moral obligation, the idealist component has a priority and in fact modifies the 
fundamental moral realism. Kant’s conception revolves around the central innovation of a non-
realist account of moral obligation in terms of the autonomy of pure practical reason. This is 
what allows Kant to defend realist theses. 
As his solution to the central problem of moral obligation combines elements of realism 
with elements of mainly voluntarist descent, Kant’s position cannot be simply ascribed to the one 
or the other camp according to the neat division made by Shaftesbury. If Kant is certainly not a 
“nominal moralist,” he does not intend to explain that morality is “really something in it-self, and 
in the nature of Things” either. His view could be characterized as an idealist version of moral 
realism or, more specifically, as the combination of a strong realism about the moral law with an 
idealist account of moral obligation.  55
Literature  
Kant 
ED Das Ende aller Dinge, AA 8 
G  Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die 
Praxis, AA 8 
GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 4 
JL Jäsche Logik, AA 9 
KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA 5 
KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 3 (B) und 4 (A) 
KU  Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA 5 
MC  Moralphilosophie Collins, AA 27 
 I would like to thank Jochen Bojanowski, Robinson dos Santos, Pat Kain, Lara Ostaric, Fred Rauscher, Dieter 55
Schönecker, Oliver Sensen, and Melissa Zinkin for helpful comments on a draft of this paper.
20
MS  Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 6 (Vorrede und Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten, 
205-228) 
MSV  Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius, AA 27 
NK  Nachschrift Kaehler (Immanuel Kant: Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie. Herausgegeben von 
Werner Stark mit einer Einleitung von Manfred Kühn, Berlin/New York 2004.) 
Päd Pädagogik, AA 9 
PPP Praktische Philosophie Powalski, AA 27 
R  Reflexionen, AA 14-19 
UDG Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der 
Moral, AA 2 
English translations are taken fromThe Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. 
Secondary Literature  
Ameriks, Karl (2003): Interpreting Kant's Critiques. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bacin, Stefano (2006): Il senso dell’etica. Kant e la costruzione di una teoria morale. Bologna/
Napoli: Il Mulino. 
Bacin, Stefano (2013): “Legge e obbligatorietà: la struttura dell’idea di autolegislazione morale”. 
In: Studi Kantiani 26, pp. 55-70. 
Bacin, Stefano (2013b): “Kant: ragioni e limiti del costruttivismo morale”. In: Carla Bagnoli 
(ed.): Che fare? Nuove prospettive filosofiche sull’azione. Roma: Carocci, pp. 101-128. 
Bacin, Stefano (2017): “A New Moral Rationalism against the Older Ones: Kant’s Criticism of 
Rationalist Moral Theories”. In: Stefano Bacin/Oliver Sensen (eds.): The Emergence of 
Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bagnoli, Carla (2011): “Constructivism in Metaethics”. In: Edward N. Zalta (ed.): The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (on the web). 
Barbeyrac, Jean (1735): “Jugement d’un anonyme sur l’original de cet abrégé”. In: Samuel 
Pufendorf (ed.): Les Devoirs de l’Homme et du Citoien. Vol. II. Amsterdam, pp. 379-435. 
(English translation in: Ian Hunter/David Saunders (eds.): Samuel Pufendorf. The Whole 
21
Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003, pp. 
267-305.) 
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb (1757): Metaphysica. Editio tertia. Halle: Hemmerde. 
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb (1760): Initia philosophiae practicae primae. Halle: Hemmerde . 
Baxley, Anne Margaret (2012): “The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and 
Kantian Value Realism”. In: Inquiry 55, pp. 567-583. 
Bojanowski, Jochen (2012): “Is Kant a Moral Realist?” In: Kant Yearbook 4, pp. 1-22. 
Clarke, Samuel (1738): The Works of Samuel Clarke. 4 vols. London: Verlag. 
Dancy, Jonathan (1986): “Two Conceptions of Moral Realism”. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society. Supplementary 60, pp. 167-187. 
Enoch, David (2011): Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gill, Michael B. (1998): “On the Alleged Incompatibility Between Sentimentalism and Moral 
Confidence”. In: History of Philosophy Quarterly 15, pp. 411-440. 
Gill, Michael B. (2006): The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gill, Michael B. (2007): “Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More like 
Math or Beauty?” In: Philosophy Compass 2, pp. 16-30. 
Hume, David (1739-1740): A Treatise of Human Nature. (Edited by David F. Norton/Mary J. 
Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.) 
Irwin, Terence H. (2004): “Kantian Autonomy”. In: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55, 
pp. 137-164.  
Irwin, Terence H. (2009): The Development of Ethics. A Historical and Critical Survey. Vol. III: 
From Kant to Rawls. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Irwin, Terence H. (2015): “Shaftesbury’s Place in the History of Moral Realism”. In: Philosophical 
Studies 172, pp. 865-882. 
Kain, Patrick (2004): “Self-Legislation in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”. In: Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 86, pp. 257-306. 
Klotz, Christian (2001): “Gesetzesbegriffe in Kants Ethik”. In: Volker Gerhardt/Rolf-Peter 
Horstmann/Ralph Schumacher (eds.): Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. 
Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Vol. III. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 55–62. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996): The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
22
Krasnoff, Larry (2012): “Voluntarism and Conventionalism in Hobbes and Kant”. In: Hobbes 
Studies 25, pp. 43-65. 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1703): Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice. (English 
translation in: Patrick Riley (ed.): Leibniz. Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972.) 
Ludwig, Bernd (1997): “Die ,praktische Vernunft’ – ein hölzernes Eisen? Zum Verhältnis von 
Voluntarismus und Rationalismus in Kants Moralphilosophie”. In: Jahrbuch für Recht 
und Ethik 5, pp. 9-25. 
Meier, Georg Friedrich (1764): Allgemeine practische Weltweisheit. (Reprint Hildesheim/New 
York: Olms, 2008.) 
Rauscher, Frederick (2002): “Kant’s Moral Anti-Realism”. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 
40, pp. 477-499. 
Rauscher, Frederick (2015): Naturalism and Realism in Kant’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Reath, Andrews (2006): Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Selected Essays. Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Reath, Andrews (2012): “Kant’s Conception of the Autonomy of the Will”. In: Oliver Sensen 
(ed.): Kant on Moral Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 32-52. 
Sensen, Oliver (2013): “Kant’s Constructivism”. In: Carla Bagnoli (ed.): Constructivism in Ethics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 63-81. 
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of (1711): Characteristics of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times. (Edited by Douglas Den Uyl. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001.) 
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of (1745): Die Sitten-Lehrer, oder Erzehlung 
philosophischer Gespräche, welche die Natur und die Tugend betreffen. (Translated by Johann 
J. Spalding. Berlin: Haude und Spener.) 
Skorupski, John (2010): The Domain of Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Skorupski, John (2012): “Aristotelianism and Modernity: Terence Irwin on the Development of 
Ethics”. In: European Journal of Philosophy 20, pp. 312-337. 
Star, Daniel (2013): “Moral Metaphysics”. In: Roger Crisp (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 818-842. 
Stern, Robert (2012): Understanding Moral Obligation. Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Suárez, Francisco (1612): “Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore.” In: Opera omnia. Paris: Vivès 
1856-1878. Vols. V-VI. (English translation in: Francisco Suárez. Selections from Three 
23
Works. Prepared by Gwladys L. Williams/Ammi Brown/John Waldron. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1944.) 
Watkins, Eric (2010): “The Antinomy of Practical Reason: Reason, the Unconditioned and the 
Highest Good”. In: Andrews Reath/Jens Timmermann (eds.): Kant’s Critique of Practical 
Reason. A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 145-167. 
Watkins, Eric (2014): “What is, for Kant, a Law of Nature?”. In: Kant-Studien 105, pp. 471-490. 
Whewell, William (1852): Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England. London: Parker.  
Wolff, Christian (1733): Vernünfftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen zur 
Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit (Deutsche Ethik). (English translation of selections in: 
Jerome B. Schneewind (ed.): Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.) 
Wolff, Christian (1736): Philosophia prima sive ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata qua omnis 
cognitionis humanae principia continentur. (Reprint edited by Jean École. Hildesheim/
New York: Olms, 1962.) 
Wolff, Christian (1751): Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, 
auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Deutsche Metaphysik). (Reprint Hildesheim: Olms, 1983.) 
Wolff, Michael (2009): “Warum das Faktum der Vernunft ein Faktum ist. Auflösung einiger 
Verständnisschwierigkeiten in Kants Grundlegung der Moral”. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie 57, pp. 511-549. 
Wright, Crispin (1992): Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
24
